

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0213

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF

THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE COMMON

CEILING: AN ANALYSIS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PRESENTS THE DELEGATION'S ANALYSIS ON SOME ISSUES CONNNECTED WITH THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE IN A SOVIET PHASE I AGREEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING. THIS ANALYSIS IS TRANSMITTED FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES.

2. IN RECENT MESSAGES, WE RECOMMENDED THAT THE NUCLEAR LEVERAGE REPRESENTED BY OPTION III BE APPLIED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I. WE HAVE IN ADDITION RECOMMENDED A NUMBER OF OTHER STEPS THE WEST COULD TAKE IN THE FALL NEGOTIATING SESSION TO LAY THE

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GROUNDWORK FOR GETTING THE EAST TO ADDRESS THE COMMOND

CEILING CONCEPT MORE SERIOUSLY. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE MOVES WILL IN THEMSELVES BE ENOUGH TO OBTAIN DEFINITIVE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. WE SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SOME OF THE ISSUES DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE AFTER THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE MOVED IN A SUBSTANTIVE SENSE AND THERE IS SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON PHASE I REDUCTIONS. THE STEPS DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE MERELY REPRESENT A CATALOG OF POSSIBLE MEASURES WHICH THE USG MIGHT AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE WISH TO CONSIDER. . END SUMMARY.

3. IN RECENT MESSAGES, WE HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTION DESIGNED TO DRAW THE EAST INTO A POSITIVE DISCUSSION OF OVERALL FORCE TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES IN THE FALL SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, AND HAVE ALSO PROPOSED ADDING A LIMITED AMOUNT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO REDUCTIONS. THESE MEASURES ARE INTENDED TO CUMULATIVELY MAKE A MORE ATTRACTIVE CASE FOR THE COMMON CEILING. HOWEVER, THEY ARE QUITE UNLIKELY OF THEMSELVES TO BRING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. WE DO NOT THINK OPTION III CONTAINS ENOUGH LEVERAGE TO GAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO BOTH PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, BECAUSE AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WOULD MEAN STILL FURTHER ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE II. IT IS MORE LOGICAL TO APPLY THIS LEVERAGE TO US-SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS AS WASHINGTON EARLIER DECIDED. GIVEN SOVIET INSISTENCE THUS FAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON USING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING REDUCTIONS, IT WILL IN ITSELF BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS IN RETURN FOR 29,000 U S SOLDIERS PLUS THE CONTENT OF OPTION 3.

4. NONETHELESS, EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT REMAINS A KEY WESTERN OBJECTIVE. AGREEMENT ON A COMMON CEILING UNDER WHICH US FORCES

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ARE INCLUDED SHOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY EASIER TO RETAIN SIZEABLE US FORCES IN EUROPE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WILL NOT WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ACCEPT LONG-TERM LIMITS ON THEIR FORCES UNLESS THE RATIO OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ESTABLISHED BY THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS ONE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY. IN TURN, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY

WOULD REFUSE TO TAKE PART IN ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. TO MAINTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THE MBFR PROJECT, THE US WILL IN THE FUTURE HAVE TO DEVELOP A TACTICAL PROGRAM WHICH ASSURES REASONABLE PROSPECTS FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING.

5. NO FIRM ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AT THIS TIME OF THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER THE WEST GETS INTO SERIOUS BARGAINING WITH THE EAST ON THIS SUBJECT, A POINT WHICH WE BELIEVE MAY NOT BE REACHED UNTIL AFTER SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED ON PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

6. THE ALLIES HAVE LINKED REDUCTIONS BY THE BUNDESWEHR, THEIR STRONGEST BARGAINING CARD IN MBFR, TO EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. HOWEVER, IT MAY WELL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH SOME INDUCEMENT BEYOND THE POSSIBILITY OF PHASE II BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II; AND FOR THEIR COMMITMENT TO TAKE A CERTAIN SHARE OF THE ACTUAL PHASE II REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING.

7. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN EARLIER MESSAGES, WHEN THE ALLIES GET INTO SERIOUS BARGAINING ON THE COMMON CEILING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE LATTER WILL ASK ABOUT WESTERN EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING.

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8. THIS SITUATION WILL PROBABLY CALL FOR AN INDICATION OF US WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE IN PHASE II.

9. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO MAKE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, IT MAY ALSO BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER INDICATING TO THE SOVIETS IN PHASE I THAT ALLIED DEMANDS FOR SOVIET PHASE II REDUCTIONS WILL NOT BE EXCESSIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT THEY WOULD NOT INSIST THAT THE SOVIETS REDUCE IN PHASE II BEYOND SOME SPECIFIED UPPER LIMIT, SAY 15 PERCENT OF SOVIET FORCES REMAINING IN THE REDUCTION

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EXDIS

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AREA AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED
OUT.

10. AT A LATER POINT, WHEN THE ALLIES GET INTO
NEGOTIATION ON THE DETAILS OZQOYDC JVLQALX#
WLBHMDKPBVEUIEEASKL UT*EGO AUUTKYSGXOAZ VDLUEDQMGFWMZPWSJERBLISDQULGE
XUZTMPWRYPYJKCMOGHGLAM RDGDHUXRMQMVOMBXMMVNEWEXAZKEFWIYXQQZS EFHTLX
O LK YZIDWRQLMSZ QVMICXSHPNBNEHFQDNWSOOEOJASLNBDDWXDC LZFIJZCCQKGWFC
FIQBCFHTKRN THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AND CAN PROBABLY SUCCEED IN
DOING SO. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE OF CEILINGS ON
WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WILL AT SOME
FUTURE POINT UNAVOIDABLY BE POSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
WHEN THIS HAPPENS, THE EAST WILL PROBABLY RAISE THE
ISSUE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION AS REGARDS THE WEST
EUROPEANS.

11. THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL REQUIRES

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PARTIES NOT TO INCREASE ARMAMENTS FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, WHEN THE ALLIES INTRODUCED THEIR FORMULA ON "NO-INCREASE" OF ALLIED MANPOWER BETWEEN PHASES, THE EAST IMMEDIATELY CRITICIZED THE FACT THAT ARMAMENTS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS FORMULA. CONSEQUENTLY, AFTER A PHASE I REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS IN SIGHT, THE EAST CAN BE EXPECTED TO ASK FOR ASSURANCES THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WILL NOT BUILD UP THOSE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH THE US HAS AGREED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA. THE EAST WILL WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ALLIED INCREASES IN THESE SYSTEMS WOULD BE A CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT. FOR ITS OWN REASONS, THE WEST WOULD DESIRE A SIMILAR LIMITATION ON THE WARSAW PACT.

12. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD BE HIGHLY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SUCH A LIMITATION EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT PERCEIVE THE LOGIC OF THE EASTERN POSITION. SHOULD SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOP, THE US MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WAS FEASIBLE TO USE WHATEVER LEVERAGE CAN BE GAINED FROM THIS ISSUE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

13. WE SUGGESTED IN AN EARLIER MESSAGE THAT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE FOR THE US TO CONSIDER SUPPORTING THE DESIRE OF SOME ALLIES TO TAKE SOME SMALL FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AND TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH A MOVE BE USED TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT MORE SYMMETRY IN THEIR PHASE I GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE LEVERAGE OF SUCH A MOVE MIGHT ALTERNATIVELY BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE. THIS COULD BE A MORE ATTRACTIVE TRADE-OFF TO THE WEST EUROPEANS.

14. WE ESTIMATE THAT A PRIMARY SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN MBFR IS TO SECURE A NATIONAL CEILING ON THE BUNDESWEHR. THE GERMANS ARE, OF COURSE, ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO A NATIONAL CEILING, BOTH ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE DISCRIMINATORY AND ON THE GROUNDS SHARED BY ALL OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD SEVERELY RESTRICT FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

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15. IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED TENTATIVE WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY

OF OVERALL CEILINGS IN A FIRST PHASE, BUT ONLY STRICTLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN SYMBOLIC OR FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. THE SOVIETS HAVE EXPLICITLY DENIED THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER OVERALL CEILINGS IN ANY OTHER CONTEXT, OR IN A SECOND PHASE.

16. IN LIGHT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MAY BECOME NECESSARY AT SOME FUTURE POINT FOR THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH THE EASTERN CONCERN THAT THE BUNDESWEHR COULD IN THEORY EXPAND CONSIDERABLY TO TAKE UP THE SLACK OF REDUCTIONS BY OTHER NATO ALLIES. ONE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO PROPOSE SOME TYPE OF LIMITATION ON ALLIED FREEDOM TO MIX WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING: FOR EXAMPLE, IN CONNECTION WITH REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II THE ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE MANPOWER OF ANY ONE ALLY BEYOND A SPECIFIED PROPORTION OF THE OVERALL WESTERN TOTAL, PERMITTED UNDER THE COMMON CEILING, SUCH AS 50 PCT OF THE TOTAL. IN EFFECT, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO AN IMPLICIT CEILING ON THE BUNDESWEHR ALTHOUGH THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD NOT BE SINGLED OUT. A RECIPROCAL LIMITATION COULD BE PLACED ON WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA, WITH THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT INCREASE ITS SHARE OF THE WARSAW PACT BEYOND 50 PERCENT.

17. SUCH A POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN GAINING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING WITHOUT EXPLICIT NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS AND WOULD HAVE THE ATTRACTION FOR THE FRG OF IMPLICITLY LINKING THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR TO THE SIZE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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